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Abstract 
We explore the ability of core inflation to predict headline CPI annual inflation for a sample of 8 
developing economies in Latin America during the period January 1995-May 2017. Our in-sample and 
out-of-sample results are roughly consistent in providing evidence of predictability in the great majority 
of our countries, although, as usual, a slightly stronger evidence of predictability comes from the in-
sample analysis. The bulk of the out-of-sample evidence of predictability concentrates at the short 
horizons of 1 and 6 months.  In contrast, at longer horizons of 12 and 24 months, we only find evidence of 
predictability for two countries: Chile and Colombia. This is both important and challenging, given that 
monetary authorities in our sample of developing countries are currently implementing or given steps 
toward the future implementation of inflation targeting regimes, which are heavily based on long run 
inflation forecasts.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the ability that traditional measures of core inflation 
may have to forecast headline inflation. Differing from most of the existing literature, we focus 
on a set of 8 developing countries in Latin America. To our knowledge, a thorough study aimed 
at quantifying this predictability for a number of developing countries has not been written yet.  
The point that we address in this paper is important because, in words of Bullard (2011a), the 
“core predicts headline” argument is fairly popular. In a context in which inflation is not easy to 
forecast (Stock and Watson, 2008) the idea that core inflation may be a useful predictor in 
principle is very appealing, especially for central banks that are responsible for maintaining 
overall price stability and need to know where inflation is heading. 
There is no unique way to define a core inflation measure. In fact there are several articles 
comparing and analyzing the behavior of different core measures. See for instance Robalo, 
Duarte and Morais (2003), Clark (2001) and Rich and Steindel (2007), just to mention a few. 
Despite the number of different core inflation definitions, one of the most widely used is based 
on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) excluding “food” and “energy” components (Robalo, Duarte 
and Morais, 2003). In this paper we follow this tradition for our definition of core measure. 
The emphasis on core inflation relies on the hope that by removing volatile components, the 
researcher may end up with a clearer indicator about future developments of headline inflation. 
According to Crone, Khettry, Mester and Novak (2013) this is the prevailing view. In fact, food 
and energy components have been historically highly volatile (for example, due to temporary 
supply disruptions), and their large price fluctuations are usually expected to correct 
themselves within a relatively short period of time. As Freeman (1998) explains, since inflation 
may be either too sensitive to exogenous variables or vulnerable to a few particular volatile 
components, it is common to use ‘‘core’’ or “underlying” inflation measures to capture trends in 
total inflation. Nevertheless, hopes are not facts, and an empirical evaluation about the 
information that core inflation may have to predict headline inflation is required. In fact, 
challenging the prevailing view, there are some interesting arguments suggesting that emphasis 
on core inflation might not be a good idea. First, core measures may have lower predictive 
ability than inflation itself because of the exclusion of items on which people spend a nontrivial 
portion of their income. This might be particularly relevant in developing economies, where the 
share of the food component of the CPI is in general higher relative to developed countries. (See 
Table B1 in Appendix B). In addition, food and energy prices might affect other prices in the 
economy and thus weaken the ability of core to predict total inflation. Second, it is frequently 
argued that core may be more demand than supply driven, and consequently more affected by 
monetary policy actions. Nevertheless, the crystal clear distinction between demand and supply 
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shocks is at least thin. The incorporation of further processed food in the CPI baskets with more 
labor and non-tradable components may have ruined that distinction. Third, and following 
Bullard (2011b), the logic of relative prices also suggests that changes in energy consumption 
triggered by price changes could put pressure on all the other prices in the economy. 
Accordingly, if energy prices continue to increase over time, it is plausible to expect that other 
prices will decrease, which means that core will underestimate total inflation during that 
period. This implies that core inflation may not be a good predictor of future headline inflation 
after all. According to these arguments, headline inflation should probably have more weight 
on policymaking decisions than core. 
Central bankers around the world have taken both sides of the debate. The European Central 
Bank and the Bank of England have an explicit focus on headline measures, and their 
policymakers pay less attention to core inflation. In contrast, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) focuses on core measures (see Smith, 2012). Following the common practice 
of the FOMC, many central banks in developing economies seem to have taken for granted the 
importance of core inflation. Consequently, this variable is usually part of the discussions about 
the stance of monetary policy.  
Differing from our paper, most articles exploring the predictive relationship between core and 
headline inflation, focus on either one or several developed countries. Besides, different papers 
use different methodologies, sample periods and definitions of trend or core inflation, which 
makes it hard to draw conclusions at an international level. For instance, Le Bihan and Sédillot 
(2000) analyze the ability of four indicators of underlying inflation to forecast inflation in 
France. The authors conclude that their out-of-sample results are not very compelling. A fairly 
similar conclusion is achieved by Freeman (1998) for the US, mentioning that measures of 
underlying inflation are not very useful for forecasting headline inflation. Bermingham (2007) 
also addresses the same topic but for the case of Ireland. Differing from the previous two 
papers, Bermingham does find evidence supporting the usefulness of a core measure when 
forecasting headline inflation. A similar result is shown by Song (2005) using Australian data. 
Crone et al. (2013) also analyze this topic for the US finding evidence of long term predictability 
from core to headline CPI, but not in the case of PCE. More efforts in these directions can be 
found in Cogley (2002), Khettry and Mester (2006), Giannone and Matheson (2007), Kiley (2008), 
Meyer and Pasaogullari (2010), Smith (2012), Stock and Watson (2015) and Faust and Wright 
(2013), but also with a focus mainly on one single developed country. More recently, Pincheira, 
Selaive and Nolazco (2016) analyze a question similar to ours, but again, with a focus on OECD 
economies.  
Our results from the analysis of 8 developing economies indicate that core inflation does have 
the ability to predict headline inflation in three quarters of our countries. This share reduces to 
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50% when predictability is analyzed at policy relevant forecasting horizons. Similarly, this 
predictive ability is sizable in only 50% of the countries in our sample.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe our data. We introduce 
the econometric setup in section III. In section IV we present our predictive evaluation strategy. 
Empirical results are presented in section V and section VI concludes. 
II. Data 
We consider the Consumer Price Index of a total of 8 Latin American countries at a monthly 
frequency: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay 
and Peru. We use CPI excluding food and energy as our main measure of core inflation1. This 
sample of countries is chosen in part for data availability and reliability and in part because 
they represent a sample of developing countries with a rich variation in income.  For all our 
economies we include data until May 2017. The starting dates differ across countries, however. 
For Chile, Mexico and Peru we have data since January 1995. For Colombia, Costa Rica and 
Paraguay, the starting date is one year later: in January 1996. Finally, the starting date for 
Dominican Republic is January 2001 and for Guatemala, January 2002. 
We obtain the data for Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico from the OECD Main Economic 
Indicators database. For the rest of the countries we use their own central banks as source for 
the data. Our series are not seasonally adjusted. 
Our basic unit of analysis corresponds to year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate computed according 
to the following simple expression2:  
   = 100 ∗ 	
 − 	
 
Similarly we define year-on-year (y-o-y) core inflation rate as follows:  
 = 100 ∗ 	
 − 	
 
Where CoreCPIt is the core CPI Index. We shall refer to    equally as y-o-y inflation rate or 
annual inflation. Similarly we shall call   by y-o-y core inflation rate or annual core 
inflation rate. 
                                                           
1
 In the case of Guatemala and Dominican Republic, we use the core measure available at their central banks. For 
Guatemala, this measure removes some highly volatile components of the CPI, such as vegetables, fruits and 
legumes. For Dominican Republic the core measure removes from CPI some highly volatile agricultural items, 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco, fuels, transportation and regulated services. 
2
 Guatemala again is an exception. For Guatemala we do not have data on CPI. We do have data on annual inflation 
rates, for both core and headline.  Therefore, instead of using the log approximation, for Guatemala we use directly 
data on annual inflation rates. 
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We depart from Stock and Watson (2002), Ciccarelli and Mojon (2010) and others, in that we 
focus only on forecasting year-on-year inflation rate at different horizons. We notice that in 
many Latin American countries the annual inflation rate is the main focus of central banks.  This 
is also the case in many countries following inflation targeting regimes, like the UK, Sweden, 
Switzerland and others. Table B1 in appendix B also shows that the countries in our sample 
either follow inflation targeting regimes or are taking steps toward the future implementation 
of an inflation targeting regime. As the target in these countries is set in terms of annual 
inflation rates, it is natural to consider models for this variable. 
During our sample period, annual inflation rates in our countries experienced huge 
fluctuations. This is probably the result of changes in monetary regimes, international and 
domestic financial crisis, a surge and decline in commodity prices and in some cases, important 
natural disasters. All these issues are reflected in periods of high inflation or high inflation 
volatility, and in general, in an unstable time series on headline inflation, in contrast with the 
more stable and homogeneous inflation processes of developed countries. See Figures 1 and 2, 
next. 
 
Figure 1: Annual inflation rate in our sample of countries 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and country specific central banks.  
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Figure 2: Annual core inflation rate in our sample of countries 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and country specific central banks.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 show some noteworthy figures for Mexico at the beginning of our sample 
period and also for Dominican Republic around 2003. These figures are explained by the 
aftershocks of the “Tequila Crisis” in 1994-1995 and by the deep domestic financial crisis 
experienced by Dominican Republic in 2003.  
At first glance, Figures 1 and 2 look extremely similar. This is in part because annual core and 
headline inflation rates are similar, but also because of the scale of the graphs. The differences 
between core and headline are maybe better illustrated in Table 1, which shows descriptive 
statistics of the series. We have also included 4 developed countries for comparison (Austria, 
US, UK and Switzerland).  
Table 1 shows that traditional dispersion measures are quite different between headline and 
core. It also shows a huge difference between inflation in our sample of developing countries 
and the 4 developed countries we use for comparison. For instance, the highest entry for 
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inflation in developed countries is 5.4 (US), whereas for our set of developing countries is 50.3 
(Dominican Republic). It is also interesting to look at standard deviations. The highest standard 
deviation for headline inflation is 1.2 in our set of developed countries, whereas the lowest 
figure in our sample of developing countries is 2.3. Differences between the developed and 
developing world are striking. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  Annual Inflation Annual Core Inflation  
  
Mean Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Chile 3.8 9.4 -3.4 2.3 2.5 6.8 -1.6 1.5 
Mexico 8.3 41.8 2.1 8.4 3.4 5.2 2.2 0.7 
Peru 3.9 12.9 -1.1 2.9 2.1 4.7 0.5 0.9 
Colombia 7.6 19.8 1.7 5.3 4.1 6.5 2.2 1.2 
Costa Rica 8.9 22.3 -1.2 4.9 6.5 12.2 -0.1 3.2 
Paraguay 7.0 19.1 0.9 3.7 4.9 11.3 1.3 2.1 
Guatemala 6.3 14.2 -0.7 2.8 4.5 9.4 0.8 1.8 
Dominican Republic 8.1 50.3 -1.6 9.1 7.5 45.8 0.5 9.7 
Austria 1.8 3.8 -0.3 0.8 1.7 2.8 0.2 0.5 
United Kingdom 2.0 5.0 -0.2 1.0 1.7 3.6 0.7 0.6 
United States 2.2 5.4 -2.1 1.2 1.9 2.9 0.6 0.4 
Switzerland 0.5 3.0 -1.5 0.9 0.3 1.6 -1.1 0.7 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and country specific central banks.  
After recording the highest inflation in the world in the 1980s, all countries analyzed in this 
paper implemented a substantial departure from past policies starting in 1990. In the 1980s the 
average inflation rate peaked above 200 percent a year in Latin-American (85% for the selected 
countries excluding Peru and 29% including Peru). In contrast, now most Latin American 
economies maintain low, single-digit inflation rates, closer to industrial-country levels. Price 
stabilization has been achieved in the region under different monetary and exchange regimes, 
ranging from exchange-rate-based stabilization and dollarization, to inflation targeting in 
combination with floating exchange rates. In fact, Latin America’s recent experience strongly 
confirms the two-corner hypothesis regarding the choice of monetary and exchanges rate 
regimes. Most countries strengthen their national currencies by adopting inflation targeting 
combined with a float, while some economies are giving up monetary policy and national 
currencies by evolving toward dollarization. For a country specific description of the recent 
historical developments in the monetary policy of our sample of economies please see Table B1 
in appendix B. 
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One of the striking figures we observe across developing countries is the high share of food on 
the CPI basket (Table B1 in appendix B). Compared to the US or the UK, where the share of 
food is below 10 percent, in the selected developing economies the lowest share corresponds to 
Mexico with 18.7 percent. The highest corresponds to Paraguay, above 30 percent. 
Consequently, the share of core inflation on CPI is above 80 percent in these developed 
economies and between 61 and 73 percent in our developing economies. This is another 
possible explanation behind the high fluctuations in annual inflations depicted in Figure 1.  
Tables A1 and A2 in appendix A show results of standard unit root tests applied to annual 
headline inflation, annual core inflation and their first differences. Results are mixed for 			and . Depending on the specific test and country, the null hypothesis of a unit root may be 
rejected or not. On the contrary, this null hypothesis is rejected almost without exception for the 
variables in first differences. This argument, in addition to our visual inspection of the series, 
makes us to consider models in differences for our variables. In particular, the bootstrap 
algorithm we use to construct critical values for our out-of-sample test is based on a model for 
annual inflation and annual core inflation rate in first differences. Figure 3 shows that annual 
inflation rates in first differences do not show evident trends in the data. 
 Figure 3: First difference of annual inflation rate in our sample of countries 
 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators and country specific central banks.  
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III. Econometric Setup 
 
Our approach considers the comparison of forecasts coming from two nested models:  
  π − π =  α! + ∑ $%!π& − π&'(%)* + +!!     (Model 1) 
 
π − π =  α! + ∑ $%!π& − π&'(%)* + ∑ ,%!% − !% -(%)* + +!!     (Model 2) 
Here {εt} represents a white noise process, h ∈ {1, 6, 12, 24} represents the forecasting horizon, 
whereas ph and qh represent the maximum lag length of π& − π& and % − !%  
respectively.  Both ph and qh are selected automatically using BIC.  We allow these two lag 
lengths to differ, but in the same range of 0 to 12.  We first select ph =ph0 in Model 1, and use the 
same lag order for ph in Model 2. Once ph is set to ph0  in Model 2, we select the parameter qh. 
With this strategy, we make sure that Model 1 is nested in Model 2.  
Models 1 and 2 are estimated via OLS. When reporting in sample results, the t-statistics 
associated with each parameter in our models are constructed using HAC standard errors 
according to Newey and West (1987) with automatic selection of the lag length according to 
Newey and West (1994) when h=1, and setting the lag length to 1.5*h whenever h>1.   
From Models 1 and 2 we construct forecasts for π − π using the direct method that is 
traditionally used in the literature, see for instance Matheson (2006).  This is in opposition to the 
iterated method of generating a multistep forecast. In this method, a single set of regression 
estimates is used to generate forecasts for all horizons.  Despite the lack of clear superiority of 
one method over another, a great majority of the forecasting literature has focused on the direct 
method. In particular, Clark and McCracken (2005) derive the asymptotic distribution of tests of 
equal forecast accuracy and encompassing in nested environments, when applied to direct 
multistep ahead forecasts. They also show that the construction of critical values for the tests 
based on a simple parametric bootstrap works well. It is in light of all this literature that we 
focus on the direct method. We acknowledge, however, that it would be interesting to explore 
whether our results still stand when using the iterative rather than the direct approach. We 
leave this question for further research. 
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IV. Out-of-Sample Predictive Evaluation Strategy 
 
Our evaluation strategy considers the comparison of two sets of forecasts coming from the 
nested models 1 and 2.   
To describe the out-of-sample exercise, let us assume that we have a total of T+1 observations on 
headline inflation (π) for a given country. We generate a sequence of P(h) h-step-ahead 
forecasts estimating the models in rolling windows of fixed size R. For instance, to generate the 
first h-step-ahead forecasts using rolling windows, we estimate our models with the first R 
observations of our sample. Then, these forecasts are built with information available only at 
time R and are compared to observation π0. Next, we estimate our models with the second 
rolling window of size R that includes observations through R+1. These h-step-ahead forecasts 
are compared to observation π0. We iterate until the last forecasts are built using the last R 
available observations for estimation. These forecasts are compared to observation π1.  
Out-of-sample analyses are usually carried out using either rolling windows, recursive 
windows or both3. When recursive or expanding windows are used, the only difference with 
the procedure described in previous lines relies on the size of the estimation window. In the 
recursive scheme, this size grows with the number of available observations for estimation. Our 
preference for rolling over recursive windows in this application obeys to the heterogeneous 
pattern of the data. The use of rolling windows is usually considered more adequate to deal 
with potential model instabilities that seem to be very likely in our case. Anyway, as we will see 
next, our approach in practice means that a rolling strategy is used for Chile, Mexico, Peru, 
Colombia, Costa Rica and Paraguay. For Dominican Republic and Guatemala, our approach is 
more similar to a recursive strategy due to data limitations. 
Being more specific, our first estimation window spans the period January 1995 to November 
2009. This means that the size of the initial rolling window includes 179 observations for Chile, 
Mexico and Peru, 167 for Colombia, Costa Rica and Paraguay, 107 for Dominican Republic and 
95 for Guatemala. In the case of Chile, Mexico and Peru, all the rolling windows that we use in 
our analysis contain the exact same number of observations: 179. For the rest of the countries, 
the size of their rolling windows goes through two phases: first, it mimics a recursive window 
by adding one observation at the time until it reaches 179 observations. From then on, they 
remain like usual rolling windows of fixed size. In practice this means that Colombia, Costa 
Rica and Paraguay experience a small increase in the first 12 rolling windows. For Guatemala 
and Dominican Republic, however, this means that most rolling windows experience and 
increment in their size, which make them fairly similar to a recursive strategy. 
                                                           
3
 Recursive  windows are also called expanding windows in some papers.  
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We generate a total of P(h) forecasts, with P(h) satisfying  
P(h)=T-h-R+2 
In practice this means that for all our countries we build the exact same number of forecasts: 90 
one-step-ahead forecasts, 85 six-step-ahead-forecasts, 79 twelve-step-ahead forecasts and 67 
twenty four-step-ahead forecasts. 
Forecast accuracy is measured in terms of Root Mean Squared Prediction Errors (RMSPE). 
Because this is a population moment, we estimate it using the following sample analog: 
SRMSPE = 7 1P(h) 9 :π − π;|=1)0  
where SRMSPE stands for “Sample Root Mean Squared Prediction Error” and π;| represents 
the forecast of π made with information known up until time t.  
We carry out inference about predictive ability by comparing the predictive performance of 
forecasts coming from the models 1 and 2 defined in the previous section. We use a t-statistic 
commonly used to evaluate predictability in nested models.  This statistic is known at least for 
three different “names”. It is equally called ENC-t in Clark and McCracken (2005), MSPE-
Adjusted in Clark and West (2006, 2007) or simply CW statistic4.   
The null hypothesis under evaluation is that all the coefficients associated to core inflation in 
model 2 are zero: 
>*: ,*! = ,! = ,! = ⋯ = ,-! = 0 
The core statistic of the CW test is constructed as follows. Let  
 Â! = :̂,!|= − D:̂,!|= − :E,!| − E,!|=F 
where E,!| and E,!| denote the h-step ahead forecasts generated from the two models 
under consideration. Model 1 is the parsimonious or “small” model that is nested in the larger 
model 2. In other words, model 2 would become model 1 if some of its parameters would be set 
                                                           
4
 We notice that the core statistic of the CW test is the same as the core statistic of the encompassing test proposed by 
Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold, (1998). This implies that the CW test is also evaluating whether a particular 
combination between the null and alternative model generates a forecasting strategy with the lowest RMSPE.  The 
novelty of CW compared to Harvey, Leybourne, and Newbold (1998) relies on the interpretation of the test as a 
method to evaluate the difference in population MSPE between two nested models, and on the fact that CW explicitly 
consider the role of parameter uncertainty.  
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to zero. Similarly, ̂,!|  = ! − E,!| and ̂,!|  = ! − E,!| represent the 
corresponding forecast errors. With some little algebra it is straightforward to show that  Â! 
could also be expressed as follows: 
GHI − JKLMNOK = 2/ℎ 9 ̂,!|:̂,!| − ̂,!|=
S!
)T
  
 
The CW statistic is built as a t-statistic using a consistent estimate of the long-run variance of 
A! = :,!|= − D:,!|= − :,!| − ,!|=F 
 
Where A! is the population counterpart of Â!.   
Clark and McCracken (2001, 2005) show that the asymptotic distribution of the CW test is, in 
general, not standard. In these papers the correct asymptotic distribution of the CW test is 
derived when one-step-ahead forecasts are used (Clark and McCracken, 2001) and when longer 
horizon forecasts are constructed via the direct method (Clark and McCracken, 2005). In the first 
paper the authors show that the resulting asymptotic distribution of the CW test in general is a 
functional of Brownian motions depending on the number of excess parameters of the nesting 
model, the limit of the ratio P(h)/R and the scheme used to update the estimates of the 
parameters in the out-of-sample exercise.  In the second paper Clark and McCracken (2005) 
provide a generalization of their results for multistep ahead forecasts. Unfortunately, the 
resulting asymptotic distribution of the CW statistic is again a functional of Brownian motions 
but now depending on nuisance parameters. While Clark and West (2007) show that normal 
critical values perform decently well when comparing one-step-ahead forecasts, the same work 
of Clark and McCracken (2005) shows that when comparing multi-step-ahead forecasts using 
the direct method, normal critical values are inadequate as they tend to produce important size 
distortions as the forecasting horizon increases5. They show, however, that a simple parametric 
bootstrap generates adequate critical values. Consequently, for the construction of our critical 
values, we basically use the same bootstrap used by Clark and McCracken (2005). We describe 
our bootstrap next: 
First we estimate the following two equations using the full sample of data for each of our 8 
countries:  
 
1      π − π =  α + 9 $%π& − π&
'
%)*
+ + 
                                                           
5
 The test becomes increasingly oversized with the forecasting horizon. This means that at longer horizons the correct 
critical values are bigger than standard normal ones. In contrast, the work of Clark and McCracken (2001) shows that 
for one-step-ahead forecasts, correct critical values are, in general, lower than standard normal ones. 
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(2)      −  =  α + 9 $%π& − π&'UVWX
%)*
+ 9 ,%% − % 
-UVWX
%)*
+ + 
 
We notice that expression (1) corresponds to a version of Model 1 designed to build one-step-
ahead forecasts. This is important, because the null of no predictive ability from core to headline 
is present here. 
 
Expressions (1) and (2) are estimated by OLS using the full sample of data selecting the 
parameters p,  pZ[\] and qZ[\] by BIC with a maximum of 12 possible lags. The residuals are 
therefore stored for sampling. We notice that, differing from Clark and McCracken (2005) and 
Kilian (1998) we do not adjust our estimates for potential small sample bias.  
 
We generate bootstrapped time series on π and  by drawing with replacement from the 
previously stored sample residuals and using the autoregressive structures of the models to 
build our pseudo data in an iterative way. The initial observations are selected by picking one 
date at random and then taking the necessary number of lags from that date backwards. 
 
We construct 5000 bootstrap replications of the pseudo time series for inflation and core 
inflation. The length of the pseudo series is the same as in our actual data: 269 for pseudo data 
on Chile, Mexico and Peru, 257 for pseudo data on Colombia, Costa Rica and Paraguay, 197 for 
pseudo data on Dominican Republic and 185 for pseudo data on Guatemala.  Our  bootstrapped 
series are used to carry out a full out-of-sample exercise and therefore to end up with one 
pseudo observation of the CW t-statistic under the null hypothesis. We sort the 5000 pseudo 
observations of the CW t-statistic and construct 10%, 5% and 1% critical values as the 
corresponding percentiles of the bootstrapped distribution of the CW statistic. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
 
In-sample analysis 
 
Tables 2-3 show results of our in-sample exercises. In particular, Table 2 shows one-step-ahead 
in-sample estimates and diagnostic statistics of Model 2. To save space, we do not report results 
for the parameters αand $%, i=0,…,p1.  Instead, we focus on the parameters directly 
associated to core inflation (,%, i=0,…,q1 ). In the first panel of Table 2 we show the estimates of 
the q1+1 coefficients ,%, i=0,…,q1. In the second panel we show diagnostic statistics. In 
particular we observe that the Durbin-Watson statistic is close to 2 in all our countries, which is 
satisfactory. Similarly, the F-test, in all cases, indicates that variables in the model are jointly 
statistically significant at tight significance levels. 
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Table 3 is more specific. It shows, for every forecasting horizon h=1,6,12 and 24, results of the 
Wald test for the following joint null hypothesis 
>*: ,*! = ,! = ,! = ⋯ = ,-! = 0 
Table 3 also reports the degrees of freedom of the Wald test statistic under the null hypothesis 
(df).  Results in Table 3 are impressive. The null of no predictability from core to headline is 
rejected in 6 out of 8 countries at the 10% significance level. The exceptions being Colombia and 
Peru. We notice, however, that when h=12, the Wald statistic for Colombia has a p-value of 0.11. 
In other words, for Colombia the null hypothesis is rejected at the 12% significance level, which 
is “borderline significant”6. Similarly, we also find evidence of predictability at the 5% 
significance level for the same 6 countries, sometimes at different forecasting horizons. 
Furthermore, for Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico and Paraguay we find evidence of a 
predictive relationship between core and headline, at the 1% significance level.   
 
Table 2: In-Sample Analysis 
Dep. Var.: d(pi) Chile Colombia 
Costa 
Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Guatemala Mexico Paraguay Peru 
d(core(-1)) -0.19** -0.090 0.15 0.40*** 0.43** 0.37*** 0.44*** 0.07 
  -0.08 (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) 
d(core(-2))       -0.19         
        (0.14)         
d(core(-3))       0.37***         
        (0.14)         
d(core(-4))       -0.47***         
        (0.13)         
d(core(-5))       0.50***         
        (0.16)         
d(core(-6))       -0.29***         
        (0.11)         
R-squared 0.43 0.34 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.60 0.41 0.34 
N 256 254 244 190 183 256 244 256 
                                                           
6
 We use the expression “borderline significant” to denote a situation in which the null hypothesis is rejected at the 
x% significant level, x% being slightly greater than 10%. Colombia for h=12 and Paraguay for h=6 are the only two 
entries in Table 3 in this situation. 
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Durbin-Watson 1.99 1.98 1.90 2.04 2.02 1.92 1.79 1.83 
F-statistic 13.89 42.16 7.48 22.49 37.76 27.85 12.41 9.48 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Schwarz 
criterion 
1.20 0.72 1.86 3.71 1.63 1.12 3.08 1.02 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. HAC standard errors according to Newey & West (1987, 1994) in parentheses. The operator d() 
refers to the first difference of the respective variable. Estimates correspond to the “beta” parameters of Model 2 in page 9, when 
h=1. 
 
Table 3 : In-Sample Wald Tests 
 
  forecasting horizon in months 
Country h=1 h=6 h=12 h=24 
Chile 5.31** 3.50* 2.87* 4.74** 
  df 1 1 1 1 
Colombia 1.19 8.50 2.54† 2.27 
  df 1 5 1 1 
Costa Rica 1.73 4.90** 1.95 0.60 
  df 1 1 1 1 
Dominican Republic 37.66*** 9.49*** 17.07*** 0.61 
  df 6 2 2 1 
Guatemala 6.40*** 6.64** 10.61*** 0.12 
  df 1 2 2 1 
Mexico 10.00*** 33.90*** 1.52 3.85** 
  df 1 7 1 1 
Paraguay 11.61*** 4.39† 0.08 0.18 
  df 1 2 1 1 
Peru 0.79 0.37 0.74 0.00 
  df 1 1 1 1 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. Wald test constructed using HAC standard errors according to Newey & West (1987, 1994). The 
test statistic evaluates the null that all “beta” coefficients in Model 2 are zero, when h=1. The acronym df  stands for 
degrees of freedom. 
 
The evidence in favor of predictability from core to headline is slightly inclined toward the 
short run (1 and 6 months), horizons for which we find evidence for 6 out of 8 countries.  At 
longer horizons of 12 and 24 months, this number of countries goes down a bit to 4 or 5 if we 
are generous and include the borderline case of Colombia when h=12. 
 
All in all, our in-sample estimates provide evidence of a predictive relationship between core 
and headline inflation for at least 6 out of 8 countries. In-sample estimates, however, are usually 
criticized because they are relatively different from a real time forecasting exercise and also 
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because they are prone to overfitting. To mitigate these shortcomings, we take the usual steps in 
the forecasting literature and move to an out-of-sample analysis.  
 
Out-of-sample analysis 
 
Table 4-5 show results of our out-of-sample exercises. Interestingly Table 4 shows evidence of 
predictability, at the 10% significance level, for the great majority of the countries in our sample. 
The exceptions are Costa Rica and Peru. Nevertheless, when h=6 the p-value of the CW-statistic 
for Peru is 0.1096, so, it is “borderline significant”.  Furthermore, we also find evidence of 
predictability at the 5% significance level for five countries: Chile, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Mexico and Paraguay. 
Differing from our in-sample results, now the bulk of the evidence in favor of predictability 
from core to headline concentrates at the short horizons of 1 and 6 months (h=1,6). Leaving 
aside the case of Costa Rica, we find evidence of predictability at short horizons for all the 
countries if we allow in this group the borderline case of Peru. In contrast, at longer horizons of 
12 and 24 months, we only find evidence of predictability for two countries: Chile and 
Colombia. 
 
Despite this greater emphasis on short-run predictability, out-of-sample and in-sample results 
are roughly consistent, with slightly stronger evidence coming from the in-sample analysis. This 
is both reassuring and consistent with a large literature either reporting more rejections of the 
null of no predictability with in-sample versus out-of-sample analyses, or providing tests and 
possible explanations for these differences. See for instance, Clark and McCracken (2006, 2012), 
Inoue and Kilian (2004), Clark (2004) and Giacomini and Rossi (2009) just to mention a few7.  
 
The CW test focuses on predictability at the population level. It either rejects the null of equal 
population forecasting ability or not. In case of a rejection of the null, it would be important to 
gauge the gains in RMSPE stemming from the inclusion of core inflation. A lower RMSPE at the 
population level, however, may not be reflected at the sample level due to noisy estimates of the 
population parameters. Nevertheless, in our application we see that every time the CW test 
rejects the null, the sample RMSPE of Model 2 is smaller or equal than the sample RMSPE of 
model 1. Table 5 shows the ratio of RMSPE at the sample level, between models with and 
without the contribution of core inflation. Figures lower than 1 favor the model with core 
inflation. Consistent with our results at the population level, Table 5 shows that for every 
                                                           
7
 We are not unique in the finding of modest discrepancies between in-sample and out-of-sample results. See, for 
instance, Rapach and Wohar (2006).  
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country in our sample, with the exception of Costa Rica, there is at least one forecasting horizon 
with an entry lower than 1. Gains in RMSPE are more frequent at short horizons. The highest 
gain is achieved when h=6 for Dominican Republic, which shows an outstanding ratio of 0.68. 
Other than that, whenever we find gains at the sample level, they are either small or moderate 
in a range of 0.91 and 0.99. 
 
Overall, our out-of-sample results are relatively consistent but slightly stronger than those 
reported by Pincheira, Selaive and Nolazco (2016), who basically analyze the same question that 
we address here, but with a different methodology and with a focus on developed countries. 
They say “Our out-of-sample results indicate that core inflation does have the ability to predict headline 
inflation in about two thirds of our countries. This share of countries reduces to 40% when predictability 
is analyzed at policy relevant forecasting horizons. Furthermore, this predictive ability is sizable only for 
less than 30% of the countries in our sample” Pincheira, Selaive and Nolazco (2016, page 21). Even 
without considering the borderline case of Peru, we could rephrase that sentence with a slightly 
stronger emphasis on predictability as follows: Our out-of-sample results indicate that core 
inflation does have the ability to predict headline inflation in three quarters of our countries. 
This share reduces to 50% when predictability is analyzed at policy relevant forecasting 
horizons. Similarly, this predictive ability is sizable in 50% of the countries in our sample8. 
Despite our results in favor of the ability of core measures to predict headline, it is a little 
intriguing that most of the out-of-sample predictability is found at short horizons. This might 
not be very useful for the implementation of monetary policy, for instance, as the common 
wisdom claims that monetary policy has little impact on the very short run. In fact, most 
inflation targeting countries define a relatively long “monetary policy horizon” within which it 
is expected that central banks may have the ability to anchor expectations and keep inflation 
under control. One possible explanation is to blame out-of-sample tests of predictive ability for 
having low power at long horizons. In fact, simulations completed by Clark and McCracken 
(2005) and Pincheira and West (2016), show a decreasing pattern in power with the forecasting 
horizon, although most of their DGPs are based on stationary VARs that naturally show a 
decreasing pattern of population predictability when the forecasting horizon goes to infinity. 
This is a plausible explanation that we cannot rule out, nevertheless, it is also possible that the 
economic content of core inflation may not be useful in the long run for some countries.   
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8
 By sizable, Pincheira, Selaive and Nolazco (2016) mean a RMSPE ratio of 0.95 or lower favoring the forecasts built 
with core inflation.  
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Table 4: Clark –West Test: Forecasting headline inflation with core measures 
  forecasting horizon in months 
Country h=1 h=6 h=12 h=24 
          
Chile 1.45* 1.70* 0.44 4.64** 
          
Colombia -1.18 -0.48 2.07** 2.06 
          
Costa Rica -0.95 -0.46 -0.87 -0.37 
          
Dominican Republic 2.00** 2.00* -0.89 -1.00 
          
Guatemala 1.15* 1.27 0.95 2.12 
          
Mexico 2.41** 2.02* 0.59 0.93 
          
Paraguay 2.80*** -0.02 -1.39 0.09 
          
Peru -0.10 1.5† -0.69 -0.64 
Notes: * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. CW statistic constructed using HAC standard errors.  Critical values come from a 
parametric bootstrap. The test statistic evaluates the null that all “beta” coefficients in Model 2 are zero. 
 
Table 5: Ratio of Root Mean Squared Prediction Errors between models 1 and 2. Figures 
below 1 favors forecasts built with core measures 
  forecasting horizon in months 
Country h=1 h=6 h=12 h=24 
          
Chile 0.99 0.93 1.00 0.91 
          
Colombia 1.01 1.02 0.98 0.94 
          
Costa Rica 1.02 1.21 1.29 1.10 
          
Dominican Republic 0.94 0.68 1.14 1.25 
          
Guatemala 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.93 
          
Mexico 0.96 0.99 1.01 1.12 
          
Paraguay 0.97 1.01 1.20 1.20 
          
Peru 1.00 0.98 1.05 1.02 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we use monthly CPI data for 8 developing countries from Latin America, to 
explore whether core inflation has some predictive power for year-on-year headline inflation. 
Our findings are fairly interesting, considering the fact that during our sample period (January 
1995-May 2017), the countries under analysis have faced changes in monetary regimes, have 
endured international and domestic financial crisis, a surge and decline in commodity prices 
and, in some cases, important natural disasters. All these issues are reflected in periods of high 
inflation or high inflation volatility, and in general, in an unstable time series on headline 
inflation, in contrast with the more stable and homogeneous inflation processes of developed 
countries. 
Despite the unstable features of the series, the good news are that our in-sample and out-of-
sample results are roughly consistent in providing evidence of a predictive relationship 
between core and headline inflation in the great majority of our countries, although, as usual, a 
slightly stronger evidence of predictability comes from the in-sample analysis. The relatively 
bad news are two: First, in only 50% of our countries we find evidence of predictability at policy 
relevant forecasting horizons and, second, gains in forecast accuracy are sizable in only 50% of 
our countries. 
All in all, we are impressed by our results. Let us recall that while the conventional wisdom 
posits that core should be a good predictor for headline inflation, there are some detractors with 
good arguments as those given by Bullard (2011b). Furthermore, our literature review reveals 
that the empirical evidence evaluating this predictive relationship is rather mixed, and mainly 
focused on developed countries, which are characterized by more stable inflation processes. 
Moreover, in the case of developing countries, we have shown that the share of core inflation in 
CPI is lower than in some developed economies. Similarly, the highly volatile food items have 
more weight in the CPI bundle of goods in lower income countries than in richer ones. These 
facts may be used to build arguments in opposite directions. On the one hand, core inflation 
may be considered less representative of headline given its lower share on the CPI. 
Consequently this argument may point out in the direction of lower predictive ability from core 
to headline. On the other hand, the greater importance of the highly volatile food component on 
the CPI in developing countries, suggest that by removing these items, as core does, one is 
removing a major source of volatility. This line of reasoning leads to suggest that core inflation 
may be a better tracker of overall inflation in developing countries relative to more advanced 
and richer economies. The presence of conflicting arguments in opposite directions requires an 
empirical evaluation as the one we have presented here. 
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Our results confirm that core is an important predictor of headline inflation for most of the 
countries in our sample in the short run, but also indicate that core inflation does not add much 
information for prediction in other countries, especially at longer horizons of one year or two.  
This is critical, as monetary authorities in our sample of developing countries are currently 
implementing or given steps toward the future implementation of inflation targeting regimes, 
which are heavily based on long run inflation forecasts. Here we have two avenues for future 
research. First, the search for potential predictors of long run inflation in developing countries 
must continue, and second, the behavior of traditional out-of-sample tests of predictive ability 
should be evaluated in their ability to detect predictability at long horizons in DGPs calibrated 
to match unstable features that are traditional in developing economies.  
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Appendix A: Unit Roots 
Table A1: Unit Root Tests for Total Inflation 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Main Economic Indicators and country specific central banks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Levels Without Drift With drift Without Drift With drift Without Drift With drift Without Drift With drift
Chile -1.663 -2.985* -7.199*** -7.208*** -1.973* -3.152** -10.871*** -10.867***
Colombia -2.775*** -2.605* -4.599*** -4.858*** -2.376** -2.076 -8.536*** -8.578***
Costa Rica -2.216** -1.573 -5.585*** -5.843*** -2.321** -2.155 -11.677*** -11.581***
Dominican Republic -1.654* -2.376 -5.636*** -5.626*** -2.332** -2.941** -9.166*** -9.184***
Guatemala -1.377 -2.483 -6.435*** -6.454*** -1.456 -2.864* -10.706*** -10.685***
Mexico -2.392** -2.883* -6.161*** -6.159*** -1.382 -1.823 -5.339*** -5.306***
Paraguay -1.485 -2.639* -6.538*** -6.558*** -2.097** -3.598*** -12.789*** -12.768***
Peru -3.151*** -3.506*** -5.506*** -5.639*** -2.643*** -3.134** -11.814*** -11.852***
* p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%. The null hypothesis of both tests indicate  the existence of a unit root.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test
Levels First differences Levels First differences
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Table A2: Unit Root Tests for Core Inflation 
 
 * p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%.  
Source: Own calculations based on data from OECD Main Economic Indicators and country specific central banks.  
Appendix B: Main Features of the Inflation Regimes in our Countries 
 
Table B1: Features of Inflation in our Sample of Countries 
 Share 
Core/CPI 
Share 
Food/CPI 
Current 
Inflation 
Targets 
Paving the way to IT 
Chile 72 19 Target 3% +/-1%. 
Adopted in 1990.  Exchange rate target from 
1984 through 1999. On the road to stationary 
inflation, the Central Bank announced annual 
inflation targets in September of each year for 
the following calendar year, until 1998. In 
September 1999 the Bank announced one more 
annual target for 2000 and an indefinite target 
range of 2–4 percent starting in 2001 
Colombia 65 28 
 
Target 3% +/-1.0% 
 
Adopted in 1999. In 1991 and 1992 the 
Constitution and the Central Bank Law granted 
goal and instrument independence to Central 
Bank.  Abandonment of the exchange rate bands 
in 1999 (after the “sudden stop” of 1998-99). 
Between 1999 and 2004 the exchange rate regime 
could be characterized as a floating regime with 
sporadic and relatively small interventions in 
the FX market aimed at restoring the level of 
international reserves or curtailing excessive 
volatility.  
Costa Rica 73 21 
Target 3% +/-1.0% 
 
Adopted in 2005. Monetary policy is moving 
towards inflation targeting but financial 
dollarization remains high. In 2005 BCCR’s 
Board decided to migrate, in a gradual and 
orderly fashion, toward a monetary policy 
strategy focused on inflation targeting-a process 
which has not concluded yet. Costa Rica has 
moved from a crawling peg regime to an 
exchange-rate crawling band and then to a 
Levels Without Drift With drift Without Drift With drift Without Drift With drift Without Drift With drift
Chile -2.102** -2.723* -7.969*** -8.021*** -2.256** -3.099** -11.967*** -11.976***
Colombia -3.697*** -3.201** -5.933*** -6.192*** -3.386*** -2.954** -12.223*** -12.241***
Costa Rica -2.048** -2.234 -5.976*** -6.103*** -2.327** -1.994 -11.46*** -11.592***
Dominican Republic -1.559 -2.197 -4.071*** -4.060*** -1.896* -2.316 -5.939*** -5.924***
Mexico -2.319** -2.710* -4.537*** -7.838*** -1.358 -1.710 -5.268*** -5.233***
Guatemala -1.671* -3.154** -5.834*** -5.851*** -1.454 -2.595* -5.816*** -5.836***
Paraguay -1.494 -2.872* -5.370*** -5.401*** -1.882* -3.188** -8.401*** -8.404***
Peru -3.235*** -3.047** -6.729*** -6.952*** -3.671*** -3.679*** -12.962*** -13.033***
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Phillips-Perron Test
Levels First differences Levels First  differences
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managed float since early 2015.  
Dominican 
Republic 
64 25 Target 4% +/-1% 
In December 2011 the central bank formally 
adopted an inflation-targeting framework and 
set a target for inflation of 5½ percent (+/-1%) for 
2012 and 4% by 2015. For most of the 1990s, the 
Dominican Republic experienced robust 
economic growth, declining unemployment 
rates, low inflation, and a generally manageable 
external position. In the second half of the 
decade, the Dominican Republic ranked among 
the world’s fastest growing economies. Toward 
the end of 2002, a banking crisis emerged and 
became full blown in 2003, resulting in 
macroeconomic instability, which was 
characterized by a large rundown in 
government deposits, a significant fall in net 
international reserves, and a substantial 
depreciation in the value of the peso.  
Guatemala 62 29 Target 4% +/-1% 
Adopted formally in 2005. In 1996, the monetary 
policy stance was relaxed through the decrease 
in the level of Open Market Operations and the 
reduction of banking reserves, as a way to 
stimulate economic activity. Because the Central 
Bank was chasing two nominal objectives with 
only one instrument, there was an important 
loss of foreign exchange reserves. It is because of 
these reasons that, at the end of 1999, the Central 
Bank began to work in order to set only one 
nominal anchor, the control of inflation, as the 
main goal of monetary policy.  
Mexico 73 19 
 
Target 3% +/-1% 
 
Adopted in 1999. In 1995 adopted monetary 
growth target as its nominal anchor, defined as a 
growth ceiling on net domestic credit. As in 
preceding years, the Bank established an annual 
inflation target of 42 percent for 1995, 20.5 
percent for 1996, and 15 percent for 1997. This 
monetary policy framework was maintained in 
1996 and 1997. In 1998, the monetary policy 
framework began a gradual transition toward an 
explicit full-fledged inflation targeting regime, 
reinforcing the role of the inflation target and 
raising policy transparency.  
Paraguay 61 30 
 
Target 4% +/-2% 
 
Adopted in 2003. Financial dollarization 
deepened in the 1990s as consequence of a 
severe financial crisis that wiped out about half 
of the banking sector, making the U.S. dollar the 
preferred currency to minimize risks for both 
savers as well as lenders. After Peru, it has the 
higher ratio of credit and deposits dollarization 
in the region.  
Peru 70 25 Target 2% +/-1% 
Adopted in 2002. Dollarization in Peru started 
with the inflationary process of the mid-70s and 
peaked during the hyperinflation of 1988−90. As 
a result of this chronic inflation, the Peruvian 
currency, the sol, was replaced by the inti in 
mid-1985, which itself was replaced by 
the nuevo sol in July 1991. While inflation was 
high, the government forced the conversion of 
foreign currency deposits to local currency, 
resulting in capital flight and financial 
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disintermediation. When the restriction on 
foreign currency deposits was lifted, re-
dollarization was quick, and by the end-1990s, 
about 80 percent of deposits (and credit) were 
denominated in foreign currency. Since the 
introduction of IT, Peru has experience a gradual 
and sustained financial de-dollarization. 
Dollarization of credit has declined by nearly 25 
percentage points during 2001−2016 to below 50 
percent by 2016. 
USA 85 7   
UK 83 9   
Source: Central Banks and Bureau of Statistics of each country  
 
